DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 201 242 HE 013 716

AUTHOR	Spitzberg, Irving J., Jr.
TITLE	Changing Universities: The Politics of Innovation in a Large Multiversity. Occasional Paper No. 8.
INSTITUTION	State Univ. of New York, Buffalo. Dept. of Higher Education.
PUB DATE	Mar 81
NOTE	84p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Department of Higher Education, 479 Baldy Hall, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260.
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC04 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Administrative Change; Administrators; Budgeting; Case Studies; *Change Strategies; *College Administration; College Planning; Consultation Programs; Deans; Decision Making; Educational Assessment; *Educational History; Educational Innovation; Evaluation Methods; *Governance; Higher Education; Institutional Evaluation; Leadership Responsibility; Political Influences; Power Structure; *State Universities
IDENTIFIERS	Collegiality; *State University of New York Buffalo

ABSTRACT

A case study of the Colleges of the State University of New York at Buffalo is presented to analyze the problem of change in higher education and the role played by a theory of change. A brief sketch of the history of the Colleges from the beginning to the end of the 1970s is presented to provide a context for a discussion of strategy of change. The following strategies for change were enacted during 1974-79: transformation from participatory decision-making to consultative governance, creation of coalitions, the establishment of procedures to evaluate units, and neutralization of university-wide leadership antagonism toward the Colleges. Some of the issues that emerged in the attempt of the Colleges to pursue the strategies for change are analyzed. The leadership of individual units was assigned to Masters, who were recruited, and the Dean's Office itself was strengthened. To implement the strategy of increasing the importance of individual Colleges, resources were provided to the units, residential units were developed, and noncredit academic programs were developed. An important instrument for transforming the political process of the Colleges into an effective consultative system with clear channels for advising the Dean was the elaboration of a complex budget process. The following additional issues are considered: the lack of resources of the colleges, the problem of the physical environment, creating political coalitions, the development of a faculty senate prospectus, the procedures used in the chartering process and the results of chartering over the five-year period, an external review of the Colleges, and the creation of an academic plan. Lessons learned in the implementation of the strategies are addressed. (SW)

ED201242

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

E. D. Duryea

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES

Department of Higher Education
Faculty of Educational Studies
State University of New York at Buffalo

HE 013 716

The Occasional Papers Series of the Department of Higher Education is a forum for research and analysis by scholars associated with the Department and its work. The Department of Higher Education, as part of the State University of New York, concerns itself with issues of relevance to New York and the broader higher education community. For information, write to the Chairman, Department of Higher Education, 479 Baldy Hall, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, N.Y. 14260.

CHANGING UNIVERSITIES: THE POLITICS OF INNOVATION IN A LARGE MULTIVERSITY

by

IRVING J. SPITZBERG, JR.

Occasional Paper Number Eight

Department of Higher Education
Faculty of Educational Studies
State University of New York at Buffalo

March 1981

Copyright 1981

0:(4

PREFACE

As the eighth Occasional Paper of the series, this paper returns to a most interesting and controversial issue at the State University of New York/Buffalo examined in the second. In that paper Arthur Levine assessed the experimental colleges which have for the past decade challenged more traditional undergraduate programs in an analysis entitled "The Life and Death of Innovation in Higher Education." Now Irving Spitzberg, former Dean of the Colleges and Associate Professor in the Department, takes a more optimistic position than did Levine. He has written a highly informative chronicle of the academic and political development of the Colleges in the context of a broader analytic perspective. Spitzberg argues that the College System is far from dead, but rather has evolved over time to meet changing conditions, including a deteriorating budgetary situation in the SUNY System. His analysis opens up a discerning view of educational innovation.

Dr. Spitzberg served as the first Dean of the Colleges between 1974 and 1978. He also has been a faculty member in Higher Education and the Center for Policy Studies at SUNY/Buffalo. He is on leave as the General Secretary of the American Association of University Professors. His publications include Universities and the International Distribution of Knowledge, published by Praeger in 1980.

Philip G. Altbach
E. D. Duryea
Editors, Occasional Papers Series

Irving J. Spitzberg, Jr.
Department of Higher Education and
the Center for Policy Studies
State University of New York at Buffalo

March 22, 1981

CHANGING UNIVERSITIES: THE POLITICS OF INNOVATION IN A LARGE MULTIVERSITY

INTRODUCTION

If one reads the literature of higher education at the end of the 1970s and compares it with the commentary of the late 1960s, one is struck by the paucity of attention to planned institutional change.[1] This evolution in preoccupation may be ascribed to the evolving historical moment. Indeed, in a world with ever fewer resources, the problem might not appear to be one of change but instead one of maintenance of some semblence of a coherent institutional structure in higher education. But the problem of change is even more important and therefore deserves whatever critical attention we may offer. The purpose of this essay is to analyze the problem of change in higher education by examination of one case and of the role played therein by a theory of change. The case is that of The Colleges of the State University of New York at Buffalo.

In presenting this case study of the Colleges from the mid-1970s until the end of the decade, I am taking certain liberties. I am not a disinterested observer. In 1974, I became the first

Dean of the Colleges. I was given the explicit charge to change the institutional structure of the Colleges and to provide an environment where the diverse interests of the Colleges could be protected while at the same time the quality could be maintained at a level which met the standards of a contemporary American university. I came to this task with an articulated theory of institutional change, which is the topic of the next section of this essay. But it is important to understand that this essay represents one person's view of the process, with all of the benefits and risks endemic in such a perspective. I have tried to keep these risks in mind and to maintain some level of impartiality in my assessment of strategies and realities in relationship to my general theory of change. Indeed, I have taken as my model the stance of the public citizen in critical reflection upon a reality for which he is accountable and through which he hopes to achieve his goals. Another way to put this point is to paraphrase John Rawls' theory of justice, where one assumes he is taking a decision, without knowing his specific role, which will be in the interest of anyone similarly situated.[2] An important difference, however, is that I have been through the process and am drawing on that experience.

In addition to the problem of my own position, there is a problem of any particular case being used for purposes of supporting general propositions. I am a proponent of case-study methodology as a way of getting the texture of reality into judgments made about explanation and also prescription.[3] The limits of one case are self-evident. But the possible promise of a single case or a few cases is communicated through such works

as those of Piaget and, in the ethical realm, Plato and Aristotle. Yet even in the universe of case studies, this particular use of a case is not a full-dress case analysis because of the lack of systematic collection of information from other participants in the reality. Insofar as the case is useful, it serves only to illustrate the empirical and normative points, not to prove them beyond a reasonable doubt. With these caveats, I now turn to the theoretical perspectives.

I. A THEROTICAL FRAMEWORK

A. Alternative Institutions in Post-Industrial Society

When one attempts to develop a strategy for change, one must be very sensitive to the particular historical and social context in which change is to occur. Since we are talking about change in the United States of the 1970s in preparation for the 1980s, we must be especially careful to understan the characteristics of contemporary historical culture which have significant impact upon any change which is to occur.

I talk about change in a post-industrial society*, not because I intend to take the total framework of analysis which is usually associated with this account based upon the work of Daniel Bell,[4] but I do wish to highlight an observation which both Bell and Amitai Etzioni offer: the dominant role of knowledge and the production of knowledge in the development of contemporary society.

In order to begin to understand a pattern of institutional

change, we need a paradigm for analysis. I draw a pattern of change from two cases: that of the development of open classrooms in Great Britain, particularly in the post-war years, and the development of the pro bono and legal aid systems throughout the United States in the 1960s. My account of change focuses upon the role of alternative institutions in developing a new diversity in the delivery of services which have, ultimately, significant impact on the operation of the larger social system.

The pattern of institutional change may be generalized as follows. One begins with a few individuals or component units trying very different approaches to providing a service or solving a problem which departs from the norm in a larger institutional system. In order to carry out these experiments one has to have a degree of autonomy at the most local level as well as some sense of system so that those who are trying an innovation can share their insights with others with a similar interest. One then has a next stage of development which requires the creation of an institutional structure to support the innovations on a larger scale with minimally adequate resources. Most importantly, the innovations must have enough visibility to create consciousness among those who are undertaking the experiments and among those who are viewing the experiments from outside. At this level of consciousness-raising and institutional development, an individual leader with systems-wide visibility becomes a critical force. The final stage of development may have one of these characteristics: first, the effectiveness of the alternative institutional system becomes

clear enough and allows it to influence the behavior of those in the larger system; second, it creates enough stability in its own operation to guarantee its continued existence as an alternative to the institutional structure within which experimentation occurs; and third, it is coopted or collapses.

The strategy for the creation of alternative institutions must be to create these instituions within larger bureaucratic systems, give them enough autonomy to test out new ideas, and then provide adequate leadership so that the ideas of the alternative institutions can be adapted and adopted by the larger bureaucratic system as is historically appropriate and ethically relevant. This last stage of development clearly depends upon the level of leadership provided at the systems-wide level and its ability to understand both historical and ethical relevance. This, then is the understanding of social change I took to the Colleges and which informed my development of a strategy for change in higher education.

B. Alternative Frameworks for Analysis

In addition to an overall paradigm of institutional change in post-industrial societies, one needs to have a clear sense of alternative analyical frameworks which will allow one to develop a particular strategy for achieving one's goals within overall institutional change. Probably the most suggestive book written in the 1970s on alternative frameworks of analysis and their relationships was Graham Allison's study: Essence of Decision: The Cuban Missle Crisis.

Allison outlines three models, which he calls the rational actor, the organizational process, and the political bargaining models. His book is a critique of the rational actor model, because of its supposedly simplistic assumptions about the impact of rational analysis on actual policy implementation. He does not believe that the assumptions of economic rationality in and of themselves provide sufficient explanation for what happened historically in the Cuban missile crisis. The organizational process model focuses upon the analysis developed by Simon and March with its emphasis upon organizational setting, standard operation procedures, and the decision rule of accepting the first satisfactory alternative. The political bargaining model focuses upon the way in which different actors attempt to enhance their individual power and bargain among themselves through coalitions to their own personal advantage. Allison's major critique is that these latter two models are necessary to understand historical events and that any attempt at imposing a simple model of economic rationality misses these important parts of the analysis of a policy problem.

A major criticism of Allison's analysis is that he oversimplifies the rational actor model and misunderstands its function. The rational actor not only offers a model which provides one explanation for what has happened or what might happen but also provides the umbrella within which all other models must be developed. The rational actor model provides the framework for justifying both goals and procedures. To say this is not to say that one does not need the insights which the other models offer, but it is to suggest that they are subservient to

rational decisions about what ought to be and how it ought to be accomplished.

*In using the designation "post-industrial," I am also questioning the Marxists' interpretation of social and political change which suggests that the social engine is driven solely by the economic infrastructure and that all other factors in social change are epiphenomenal. My position in regard to the Marxist thesis is that it needs to be turned on its ear--to paraphrase Marx himself--or that Hegel needs to be taken more seriously. I do not intend to reject the critical role of economic institutions in all significant social change, but I do suggest that in understanding the operation of the economic infrastructure one must be quite aware of the role of ideas and knowledge in its regular functioning. Indeed Lord Keynes was quite right when he said that most practical men are following the dictates of philosophers long dead. The insight of the post-industrial critics is that one cannot view the economy narrowly but instead must be very sensitive to the role of knowledge production in the economic sector and the impact of the structure of knowledge on social change. The greatest social power is invested in those who have knowledge and who are able to use and develop institutions to generate further knowledge. It is for this reason that I believe that we should describe our contemporary social context as one of a post-industrial society--that is a society which is not determined in its direction by the operation of an industrial infrastructure but instead has as its most important factor in change the generation of ideas and their use in the social system.

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COLLEGES

The idea of the Colleges pre-dated the major campus battles of the sixties and grew out of the deliberations at the State University of New York at Buffalo during its transition from a private university to a large research center of the State University of New York system. In the mid-sixties under the leadership of the short-term president Martin Meyerson, the university developed grandiose plans for the creation of a megaversity of 40,000 students. In anticipating such a huge university, Meyerson developed the strategy of creating what he called "intellectual neighborhoods" which would be relatively small and which would create the feeling of community as part of the emerging multiversity. A new campus was designed with physical structures for colleges as an integral part.

Originally six colleges were formed in response to a university-wide committee's recommendation in the mid-sixties which envisaged the development of small intellectual neighborhoods of about 500 people in a megaversity of 40,000 students. This plan was tied to the construction of a new campus with 30 colleges to provide residential and academic settings. Each of the first six colleges was formed by identifying a master who was, in turn, to invite other faculty and students to join. There was no systematic attempt to develop a collegiate university for the total system at once. After a number of false starts and without the investment of significant resources by the administration, the Faculty Senate in 1969 offered a set of guidelines for the operation and development of the colleges

which was quite in keeping with the spirit of the times. This Stern Prospectus, named after the chair of the Committee to draw up the document, Professor Robert Stern of the Political Science Department, provided a description of participatory governance with little administrative structure and with few, if any, criteria for evaluating the operation of individual units or the system as a whole. This Prospetus was the document which provided the constitutional basis of the system until 1974.

In 1970, there was a massive confrontation between radical students and faculty, on the one hand, and the administration and the larger community, on the other. In response to this period of disruption, which was complicated by the fact that President Martin Meyerson had taken a leave of absence and then resigned and there was an Acting President, the University installed a new President, Robert Ketter, who had been part of the original committee to draft the plan for the Colleges, but who after the revolt came to view the Colleges as the point of great political opposition to him and to the State University.

During the period of 1970-1974, the Colleges had an occasional Director but, for well over half the time, had no leadership whatsoever. Decisions were made collectively but were clearly dominated by a few Colleges (there were supposedly 15) and indeed a handful of individuals. The collective decision-making system was in fact decision by committee of those who could sit the longest and talk the loudest. Almost none of the decision makers in the Colleges in the collective decision-making process had any other affiliation with the University. Only the

Director had a tenured affiliation with the University, and for most of the time there was no Director. The Stern Prospectus provided absolutely no administative structure for the Colleges and no framework for leadership.

In 1973, the Faculty Senate, under the leadership of Professor Jonathan Reichert, organized a committee to evaluate the Colleges and to make recommendations for their future. In addition, the Acting Director resigned. The Faculty Senate then decided to develop a full constitutional system for governing the Colleges and to recommend the recruitment of a Dean of the Colleges to sit as a peer with the Deans of all other Faculties of the University. After a major confrontation between the Colleges in their collective decision-making guise, on the one hand, and the Faculty Senate, the President and the Academic Vice President, on the other, over almost every aspect of the Prospectus, the Faculty Senate passed a constitutional document to govern the operation of the Colleges, creating a consultative instead of a collective decision-making system. The President approved the Prospectus on the whole but with some reservations about detail.

The Dean was vested with line authority but was constitutionally obliged to consult with the leaders of the Colleges individually and in a collective setting before making policy decisions. In addition, an evaluation system for individual Colleges was established. A chartering process was designed which required Colleges to be reviewed and granted a charter with a time-limited duration after which there would be further review. A chartering committee including representatives

from the Colleges, the Faculty Senate, and the administration, was to be convened to carry out the evaluation.

The constitutional document, the Prospectus, was given a duration of four years. At the end of that time an external evaluation was to be conducted along with the review of the constitutional document itself before further authorizing legislation for the Colleges. The recommendations of the Reichert Committee were generated with the advice of external consultants brought in to evaluate the Colleges as a system. I was recruited as Dean of the Colleges. This, then, was the constitutional and leadership setting of the Colleges in 1974.

Before the first chartering process in 1974-75, there were 15 Colleges on paper and 13 in actuality. After tumultuous implementation of the chartering process in the academic year 1974-75, 10 Colleges were re-chartered for limited durations and with certain conditions, two Colleges were chartered conditionally with the demand for immediate changes, and one College was denied a charter. Because of the number of Colleges involved and the novelty of the evaluation process, the actual chartering procedure was a difficult and not altoghether satisfactory undertaking. But the feasibility of the evaluation system with its constitutional basis proved itself during the first year.

Some of the significant issues arose with the two Colleges which were given limited charters--the Women's Studies College and a Marxist college. Women's Studies College had developed a series of classes for women only. The question of male exclusion

became the focus of a debate about Women's Studies College, and the passage of Title IX caused a major confrontation between the individual College and the larger University. In the end, Women's Studies College was re-chartered when it agreed not to continue to exclude men from its classes. The second College evaluated and given a conditional charter was a Marxist college which, in the end, could not meet the requirements of faculty participation central to the development of the Prospectus and was denied its charter at the end of the next academic year. Even after chartering, the Colleges were still visible as providing very different educational experiences which were controversial within the larger community. But the changes which were made in the Colleges were all made within the guidelines set by the constitutional process envisaged by the Prospectus passed by the Faculty Senate and approved by the President. During the 1974-75 academic year, a number of the Colleges became residential, transforming the nature of the system, since in 1974 only two Colleges had been residential. In 1974-75 all but three Colleges became overwhelmingly residential undertakings which combined academic and residential programs.

Four factors in the University context are relevant in understanding the evolution of the Colleges from 1974 through 1979. First, the President, Robert Ketter, was reappointed for a five-year term in 1974. His negative view of the Colleges did not seem to change significantly. Second, there was a high turnover of Academic Vice Presidents, the administrative officer to whom the Colleges reported. During this period there were four different Academic Vice Presidents. Third, this was a

period of declining resources. Indeed, the 1975 New York City financial crises led in 1976 to a significant reduction in the rate of budget growth for the University. Fourth, the leadership of the Faculty Senate varied dramatically. Immediately after the passage of the Prospectus, a Chair was elected who was vehemently opposed to the Colleges. But following Jonathan Reichert's two-year term as the Chair of the Colleges Committee during the writing of the Prospectus, he became the Faculty Senate leader. All of these contextual factors affected the evolution of the Colleges.

Over time, enrollments in the Colleges grew slightly and then remained steady compared with declining enrollments in the larger university. About 6,000 students took courses in the Colleges each year. By 1977-78, approximately 1,500 students lived in the residential Colleges. There was a new college--International College--and the overall budget of the Colleges remained relatively steady in real purchasing power although in actual dollars it increased about 50 per cent.

In 1977, I indicated that I would resign effective September 1978. In addition, during the 1978 year, the Faculty Senate undertook its review of the Prospectus in preparation for revising it for another four-year period. An external commitee was invited in to evaluate the Colleges. The external evaluating committee reported, according to its chair, who had been part of the original evaluating committee, that the Colleges had improved dramatically during the term of the Prospectus and recommended the further commitment of resources from the

University and the maintenance of the constitutional system through the Prospectus. The Faculty Senate passed a revised Prospectus, which was reviewed by a committee composed of members of the Faculty Senate and the Colleges, with only one dissenting vote. This stood in contrast to the massive disagreements over the first Prospectus in 1974. During the academic year 1978-79, an Associate Academic Vice President, Claude Welch, who was a former Master of Rachel Carson College, became Acting Dean while a search for a new Dean was pursued. At the same time the University suffered a significant budget cut, which the Colleges had to share to a degree that was significant but not dangerous to the overall life of the system. In the fall of 1979 after two extensive and ultimately unsuccessful external searches, Profesor Murray Schwartz of the English Department was appointed Dean.

This brief sketch of the history of the Colleges from the beginning to the end of the seventies, provides context for a discussion of strategy of change which developed when I became the Dean of the Colleges. It is important in reading my outline of this strategy to remember that it was developed in 1974, when the Colleges had never had a Dean and when there was great antagonism between the Colleges, on the one hand, and the Faculty Senate, the administration, and the community at large on the other. There was nothing short of siege mentality, which had become part of the legacy of the Colleges since the early 1970s. We can now turn to the strategy for change.

III. THE STRATEGY FOR CHANGE: 1974-1979

A. Transformation from Participatory Decision Making to Consultative Governance

It is ironic that the goal of increasing participation in the governance of the Colleges necessitated changes in both the constitutional structure and the ideology of the Colleges which, at first glance, may appear to be a reduction in the actual control exercised by those who participate in the governance system. As the major legacy of the sixties, the Colleges were run in 1974 by a collective decision-making procedure through a Collegiate Assembly. This Assembly had no officers, although it was chaired by the then Director of the Colleges. However, a handful (one hand) of people actually structured all decision making and in the end made most decisions with only minor modification to their preferred position. These people were in no way "elected" by any constitutional process and were accountable to no one other than the Assembly itself. My own experience with this Assembly when I first arrived confirmed the views of a number of independent observers in the University, suggesting that decisions were being made by a very small group of people who were willing to stay the longest (meetings often lasted six hours) and talk the loudest. On almost all issues from curriculum through budget, a small clique of graduate students and nonstudents directed decisions by filibustering until only they and their friends were left in the room. So if one took seriously the need for broad participation in decisions, it was clear that there had to be a change in the way in which

decisions were made and accountability was maintained. My strategy was to create a system of consultation, where the Dean made decisions and therefore could be held responsible for them, but only after formal consultation with all relevant constituencies, focusing on a formal internal governance system. This strategy was one of identifying responsibility and accountability but maintaining formalized consultation.

B. Creation of Coalitions

A major goal was to improve the status of the Colleges and therefore give more power to the Colleges in the larger political systems. This goal required sensitivity to the Allisonian governmental power model with its focus on interest groups bargaining and the pursuit of self-interest in policy recommdations. Because of the combination of fragmentation and hierarchy within the University and the explicit ethos of the Colleges, the task of coalition building had to be approached both internally and externally. The external constituencies included not only the formal University but the larger community, which had contact with the Colleges regularly and had a negative vision of the Colleges based on the history of the early seventies. The major strategy of coalition building within the Colleges was one which attempted to allow each College to develop an identity of its own and to create an interest in maintaining that identity without submerging it within a collectivity known as the Colleges. The strategy of identity building through coalitions within the Colleges became an important part of the

improvement of the political stability of the system itself.

The strategy of coalition building within the University was quite clear. The Faculty Senate historically had a special relationship with the Colleges and indeed had very important power (though seldom used) in dealing with a whole range of issues in the larger University. Although the Faculty Senate often had weak leadership--and sometimes leadership hostile to the Colleges--it still provided a very important venue for building a coalition with the Colleges within the University. So the strategic principle was one of developing a strong relationship with the more progressive members of the Faculty Senate and building a faculty base throughout the University; then affiliations between regular University faculty members and individual Colleges would cut across the whole range of departments and disciplines in the University. This strategy of coalition building within the University was complemented by an effort to create relationships with specific faculties through deans and-or especially friendly departments.

The relationship with the larger community started off on an individual College basis. Each College saw the importance of maintaining and enhancing its relationship with the appropriate constituencies in the larger political community. The most usual form of community bridge-building was one of recruitment of nonuniversity faculty on an ad hoc basis for particular courses. But over time the strategy was formalized through the creation of institutional relationships in the form of community boards for a number of the Colleges. This then blossomed into a Dean's Advisory Committee drawn from important members from the

community for a larger grouping of the Colleges. But the important strategic point was that each College recognized how critical the building of community bridges could be, both because of the legacy of controversy in the community drawn from the late sixties and early seventies and because of the importance of community resources to the maintenance of the curricula of individual Colleges.

C. The Establishment of Procedures to Evaluate Units

Perhaps the two most important goals for the Colleges in 1974 were: first to develop some mechanism to insure credibility within the larger university; second, not to sacrifice in the process the diversity among units which was the stength of the system as a whole. It was quite clear at that time that these goals required an institutionalized system of evaluation which recognized the legitimacy of the interests of those who were being evaluated but applied standards drawn from the larger university community. The central issues in the relationship between the Colleges and the larger University was a conflict in vision of what universities ought to be doing. In order for the Colleges to continue as part of the University, however, it was important to relate the vision of individual Colleges and the practice in those units to the standards of the host system. The strategy of creating a constitutional system for evaluation became the centerpiece of the overall approach to change in the Colleges.

D. Neutralization of University-wide Leadership Antagonism Toward the Colleges

The goal of improved political status and the goal of credibility both argued for a massive attempt to change the view of university-wide leadership of the Colleges so that in resource allocation and in curricular decisions the particular problems would be viewed on their merits and not filtered through preconceived notions of what was wrong with the Colleges. The strategy of improving the relationship with the central administration had two components--the first was one of having the Dean develop personal relationships with the appropriate university-wide administrators and attempt to use his credibility as a new leader to provide a more positive view of the Colleges; the second was to begin self-consciously developing relationships between individual administrators and particular Colleges so that first-hand experiences would be used to provide information which would in turn create a sense of involvement with individual units. The strategy itself is talked about as neutralization only because the expectations were relatively modest in that the history of antagonism, particularly of the President, was so clear and so ingrained. Indeed an assessment of the effectiveness of these strategies would suggest that the most one could identify as an accomplishment would be neutralization in certain situations but not the creation of a firm and public commitment to the Colleges.

Historically, one of the explicit goals of the Colleges has been that of changing the larger University. As in all other attempts at massive reformation (although the rhetoric of

revolution was often used, it was quite inappropriate in this particular setting), the actual goal was much more modest in that most of the Colleges viewed their role as one of creating the basis for guiding the evolution of the University through a strategy consistent with the theory of alternative institutions outlined earlier. The major element of the strategy was one of taking certain initiatives in conjunction with other units to create new programs through coalitions and partnerships and thereby to modify the direction of the larger University. For example, the Colleges cooperated with the Faculty of Scoial Sciences in the creation of a human services major. Also, the Colleges pursued this goal of systematic change by offering public and vocal critiques of various issues central to the life of the University at any moment. An example of this critical role was the Colleges' sponsorship of a written debate about the academic planning process in the University campus newspaper. This role of public gadfly was one of the major institutional strategies for changing the larger University.

With these strategies for change in miond, we can now turn to a number of examples from the history of the Colleges from 1974 to 1979 to illustrate the tactical implementation of these strategies and provide the basis for some assessment of their success or failure.

IV. THE TACTICS OF CHANGE

In order to get a feel for the texture of life in the College from 1974 through 1979, it will be useful to analyze some of the issues which emerged in the attempt of the Colleges to pursue the strategies for change outlined in the pervious section. I have organized these issues under each strategic category and shall briefly present an account of the way in which the issues affected the life of the Colleges in this period and in so doing draw on the analytical perspectives outlined earlier in this essay.

A. Leadership Recruitment

In 1974, there were two levels of leadership vacuum in the Colleges. The most important level was that of each individual collegiate unit. Before the chartering process of 1974 there was no identifiable faculty leader in most Colleges. Although the Colleges had been founded by the appointment of Masters in six units, with the exception of Clifford Furnas College, under the leadership of physicist Lyle Borst, none of the original Masters remained. And in 1974, Borst himself resigned. so there was a blank slate on which there was a great need for inscription of leadership. Leadership in individual units had been vested in a handful of graduate students. So a major task was the recruitment of Master, and over the next two to three years, the Colleges were very lucky in the calibre and experience of Masters recruited.

Among all the Colleges, only Women's Studies College, which

had a long history of unique governance, maintained a position which demanded continuous graduate student leadership. However, even in Women's Studies College, there were two or three faculty members who participated very actively in a manner not different from those who actually took the title of Master. The recruitment of a group of quality Masters proved the essential step in the movement toward a system of leadership which allowed decisions to be taken in the context of consultation. It was the improvement in quality of Masters, who had credibility and personal contacts in the University community as well as the larger community of Western New York, that allowed the consultative system to develop greater sophistication and maintained participation with some accountability to the interests of all of those whose futures were at stake in the life of the Colleges.

The quality of the leadership of the Colleges at the unit level has been documented by the fact that a number of people in leadership positions in the Colleges moved on to other academic administrative roles. For example, the Master of College H, after a major disagreement with the Vice President for Health Sciences, was able to translate his experience in the Colleges into a Deanship in a School of Health Related Professions elsewhere. And the Academic Coordinator in College H Went on to become an Assistant Dean in the Division of Undergraduate Education. The Master of Rachel Carson College went on to become the acting academic vice president of the University. This pattern of using the administrative experience in an individual college as a stepping stone to other leadership opportunities is

one which is emerging and is likely to become a continuing precedent.

The other level of the leadership recruitment which was imperative was the construction of the staff in the Dean's Office itself. First, there was the role of the Dean, which was not passive but active in taking positions and initiating actions in a manner quite different from the pattern of the former Director/Assembly relationship. Second, there had never been a Dean of the Colleges, only a Directorship which had been vacant for two years. In 1974 the staff of the Colleges consisted of two secretaries, one of whom had by herself taken over most of the administrative leadership, and a student who handled the financial affairs. From this less than satisfactory and jerry-built arrangement, over the five years a very strong Dean's staff emerged with two associate deans, one with an A.B.D. from Yale in Slavic Studies and the other with a Ph.D. in counseling psychology.

B. Creating Individual Collegiate Identity

A major impediment to transforming the old Collegiate Assembly into a new consultative decision-making system was the fact that for the most part the actual participation in decision making through the Collegiate Assembly was very limited indeed. The leaders of two to four Colleges dominated the total system. The rest of the Colleges participated only sporadically and with very little enthusiasm. If the newly revised governing structure which identified a Colleges' Council with representation from

each College was to act as a consultative body for the Dean, it was very important that each unit have a clear sense of its interests and be prepared to participate in a responsible and mature manner in decisions for the total system. Because of the domination by the unit "The Colleges" over individual Colleges, it became apparent that before the political system could operate effectively in a consultative framework the individual units would have to have a sense of their own identity and a sense of authority in their own spheres so they would feel as though they were participating as equals in the consultative process. The tactics used to implement the strategy of increasing the importance of the identity of individual Colleges included, in addition to the recruitment of strong Masters, the clear provision of resources to individual units, the development of residential units for nonresidential colleges, and the encouragement of the various noncredit academic programs around the themes of the individual colleges. The building of communities became a major tactic to create individual unit identities as well as a goal in and of itself.

Some Colleges had clear identities apart from the mere provision of courses--particularly the Colleges such as residential units College B and Clifford Furnas College and the nonresidential units Tolstoy and Women's Studies College. But for many other Colleges in 1974 and 1975, the major identity was as the sponsor of courses. With the establishment of residential units in the Ellicott Complex, all of the Colleges by 1979 had clear individual identities which gave them authority, constituencies, and political visibility. Because of the

confidence which this instilled in the leaders of the Colleges, the tone of the consultative system changed and became one where equals bargained and shifting coalitions developed, which is a necessary condition for the operation of a representative political system.

C. The Budget Process

Perhaps the single most important instrument for transforming the political process of the Colleges into an effective consultative system with clear channels for advising the Dean was the elaboration of a complex budget process. Because of the centrality of resource allocation in any political system, the character and integrity of a budget process will in fact play a major role in determining the process and integrity of the larger political environment. If people feel that they are listened to and have a voice in resource allocation and understand the complex issues involved in evaluating competing programs, then there will be a trust that will accrue to the benefit of the larger system. The budget process of the Colleges in the spring of 1974 before the real transformation began was one where each College put in its request and then, in the end, the group would argue over each line item as well as the total budget and make some intuitive judgment without any systematic comparison of the alternatives. The Colleges which received the most resources were those represented by the three or four leaders who dominated the total Collegiate Assembly.

During the next four years, the major task in constructing a

more rational and positive budget process was one of convincing the Collegiate System that it was possible to have a reasonable discussion of criteria by which to evaluate programs and then to generate data which were relatively real to which the criteria could be applied. It took approximately two years for the Colleges to agree on an outline of criteria which could be measured in terms of the activities of the diverse set of units which made up the Colleges. The criteria were devised to measure secondary indicators of accomplishment which assumed some semi-market framework where, if people participated in the Colleges' programs, they were making a judgment about its effectiveness. So course enrollments, numbers of students resident in the Colleges, and other measures of participation in collegiate activities were combined to create a unit known as "gross student credit hours." These gross student credit hours included both hard and soft data. The hard data were provided by a computer. The soft data were drawn from lists of participants in various activities provided by individual Colleges and then validated by the graduate assistant in the Dean's office providing institutional research.

The role of the graduate assistant for institutional research was central to informing the collective decision-making process which generated criteria and final calculations upon which budgets were allocated. The graduate assistant always modeled the impact of changing various criteria and their weighting on budget allocations and was able to provide weekly feedback to the budget process of the Colleges so that it would understand the impact of making changes which were intuitively

suggested by various Colleges. The importance of such information in the evolution of a budget process was a very important insight which participants in this particular aspect of the transformation of the political system came to understand.

However, I must acknowledge that during the first two years the creation of the criteria and the calculation of gross student hours leading to an allocation formula were set in place in response to an ultimatum from me that if the Colleges as a group could not articulate reasonable criteria fo allocating resources and then develop a formula applying them to data whose validity could be tested, then I myself would do it for the system. Because of the commitment of everyone concerned in the Colleges and myself to the consultative process, in each instance the Colleges generated an allocation formula based on reasonable criteria which I could accept with only minor modification. During the last two years of the process, the Colleges had become so adept at following this structured budget process, that there was never any significant disagreement between me and the Colleges about the process. Indeed, by the end of the five years the process had become so formalized and structured that it was my judgment that it needed to be loosened up. That was to be a task for the new Dean.

The overwhelming impact of the budget process on the total decision making of the Colleges was that it demonstrated to the Colleges and the larger university that it was possible to have a formally structured consultative system involving relatively large numbers of persons in very complex decision making. It was

clear that everyone had a role in establishing the rules of the game and that the rules of the game would be applied even-handedly to those who participated in the decision-making process. The coalitions that developed in the budget process established a broad middle group of colleges which then could play decision-making roles in regard to the whole range of issues facing the Colleges. Because these colleges and their leaders developed trust in the budgetary decision-making process, they were much more likely to have the trust necessary to deal with other problems that were central to the long-term future of the Colleges--such as decisions about curricular emphasis in courses and the relationship between the Colleges and larger University processes including planning and curriculum development. Both the standard operating procedure and the political bargaining which characterized the budget process established the pattern for other decision challenges in the Colleges. The tactics used in the budgetary process were central to the overall strategy of transforming a participatory decision-making system dominated by a few to a consultative decision-making process which clearly vested responsibility but which involved a larger number of people more actively.

D. The Problem of Relative Poverty

Another reason that the Colleges were able to develop the budget process that helped transform the overall decision-making procedures from "participatory" to an effective consultative system was the relative poverty of the Colleges in relation to all of the units in the University. This relative poverty is

best illustrated by the fact that every calculation of cost per student credit hour between the Colleges and the larger University over a number of years hovered in the following ratio: the Colleges cost between $10 and $20 for a student credit hour; the average for the larger University was between $65 and $75 per student credit hour.[7] This relative poverty made the establishment of a rational and trusted decision-making procedure even more pressing. But it also acted as an impediment. The need to distribute such scarce resources in a manner that left fully justified claims unmet contributed to a sense of exploitation by the larger University which always harmed the overall development of the Colleges. The line between cost effectiveness and poverty was very thin, and we never knew on which side we stood.

A major tactic developed by the Colleges to deal with the problem of relative poverty was to learn to draw on nonmonetary resources in both the University and the larger community. Over the years we used a lot of voluntary faculty time. We also used other people's budgets--for example, we mounted summer school programs and continuing education courses in the evening which allowed us to put our personnel on other units' budgetary allocations.

E. The Problem of the Physical Environment

The physical setting of the residential Colleges became both an opportunity and a problem for the Colleges. The Ellicott Complex was a collection of 36 buildings connected together in a

piece of striking architecture which included room for 3,000 students, 200 faculty members, and a whole range of supporting services. The square footage was greater in the Complex than in many undergraduate liberal arts colleges. But the structure was designed in the mid-sixties upon the theory that the appropriate unit for habitation and the development of community was on the scale of about 500 students. Our experience quickly demonstrated to us that the number 500 was too large for the development of coherent communities of interest and participation. So in a complex with six quadrangles we immediately identified the need to create a minimum of two Colleges per quadrangle in order to maintain manageable scale. The actual range of residential community size was from about 80 to 350.

The structure itself had been designed according to a program which was written by people who did not understand the need to create communities nor the actual conditions necessary for participation in an academic life as well as comfortable residential setting. The physical structure became a major impediment to creating the sense of community and neighborhood which was necessary for the transformation of the political system. However, because of the commitment of leadership of individual units as well as the Colleges as a whole, the Colleges developed very interesting techniques for overcoming long hallways, a large number of rooms with four students in them, a complete lack of support activity space in the particular quadrangles, and the separation of housing-governance functions from collegiate responsibility, all of which contributed to roadblocks to the development of the neighborhoods and

intellectual communities which were the major goal of the Colleges.

In spite of these impediments, the Colleges developed a number of approaches to creating the communities necessary to insure participation and the development of college identity. Student residential governance structures emerged. The conversion of small faculty offices to activity space became an important part of the program life of the College, because of the necessity of having secure space for on-going projets. The construction of social lives within relatively artificial geographical areas contributed to the development of identity.

It was the creation of these residential communities, as well as the two nonresidential neighborhoods in Tolstoy and Women's Studies College, which in the end was the major contributor to the transformation of the Colleges political system. There emerged a coherent group of people who held common interests, though not common ideas, to whom the representative leaders could go for purposes of testing ideas and developing positions. The establishment of identifiable communities is a necessary condition for an effective political process. The amorphous character of the constituencies of the various Colleges prior to 1974 was one of the reasons that it was possible for a small group of people to dominate the total system. With the establishment of student, faculty and community groups sharing a common identity through a College it became impossible for the overall Collegiate political process to exploit or dominate the interest of any one of its parts. The establishment of community

neighborhoods in the Colleges contributed immeasurably to the justice and fairness which is central to a consultative decision-making system.

F. Creating Political Coalitions

The exercise of coalition building within the collegiate system itself was a strategy which followed directly from the general theories concerning change which informed my actions as Dean of the Colleges. The development of coalitions within the system had to be between those units which would be most effective in developing further coalitions outside of the system. In 1974, there was a pre-existing coalition for the politically active Colleges--especially Colleges such as Social Sciences College (the neo-Marxist College), the Women's Studies College, College E (a College which had no special theme but which offered more courses than any other college and which was later to be transformed into a minority college, Cora P. Maloney College), Tolstoy College and the New College of Modern Education. This coalition of Colleges, which was in fact a coalition of one or two graduate student leaders from each College, effectively ran the old Collegiate Assembly. During 1974-75, the impact of the chartering process began to loosen this coalition in that many of these Colleges in 1974 were unable to meet chartering. In the chartering process in 1975, the New College of Modern Education, College Z and College E in its original form, no longer were Colleges in the system. Their leaders had left. By the end of 1976, the Social Sciences College had been denied a charter renewal, because of lack of regular faculty involvement and lack

of a student constituency. Only Women's Studies College and Tolstoy remained and the leadership of Tolstoy College did not always see issues in the way that the leaders of Women's Studies College viewed them. So this pre-existing coalition had, for most purposes, been reduced in scope and no longer could command the whole system.

In the meantime new leadership in Rachel Carson College, College H, and the pre-existing leadership in Colleges B, Math Sciences, and the newly crated College of Urban Studies, along with Clifford Furnas College, began haltingly to develop a broad middle ground in the Colleges which started to set the limits upon the debates and the range of actions which the overall Colleges Council would take. The coalitions among these Colleges shifted from time to time but, because of the new leadership recruited into these Colleges, a real sense of coalition emerged. I deliberately assisted leaders in these Colleges in developing their positions and created coalitions to support the other steps toward the transformation of the political system of the Colleges which I thought were important--particularly in curriculum and budget. By 1977-78, the evolution of coalitions around particular issues no longer required my active intervention and the maturing of the collegiate political system saw a number of instances where coalitions were cut across pre-existing political categories--for example, Tolstoy and College H would vote together.

In one sense, perhaps the most sophisticated College in the exercise of coalition building was Women's Studies College. But

their commitment to a very strong radical feminist ideology which colored their analysis of any issue made it rather difficult for them to build broad-base support for positions which were viewed as counter to the intersts of the middle of the Colleges. More often than not, their attempts at building coalitions were unsuccessful and prompted the further strengthening of the middle group in the Colleges.

The important implication of this tactic of coalition building within the Colleges was that it was absolutely necessary for a successful consultative system. An ideologically-based fragmentation of the Colleges would not have allowed the sort of constructive dialogue which is central to a consultative system. In the early days of the Colleges, there were moments when there were dramatic confrontations between me and the original leadership of the Collegiate Assembly. Indeed during the first two or three months, meetings of the Collegiate Assembly were really dialogues about political philosophy between me and the original leadership of the radical Colleges. But by the end of the four years, meetings of the Colleges Council were cooperative efforts to explore nuances of important issues in developing practical solutions to the problems facing the Colleges internally and to develop sophisticated strategies to approach strategically the issues posed by the larger University and community. This evolution resulted from the ability of the system itself to develop shifting coalitions and a broad middle ground which allowed reasonable debate about specific issues.

Because of the history of disagreement between the Colleges and the President, dating from 1970, it was apparent to me early

on that it was critical for the Colleges to attempt to develop strong coalition relationships with other operational units in the University, particularly those with university-wide constituencies. This emphasis followed from my theory of institutional change in that only by the effective creation of coalitions among alternative institutions can one begin to maintain the existing alernatives, much less begin to change the larger system. And, in addition to creating coalitions of alternative institutions, it was important under this theory to develop networks of people who are interested in changing the units within which they work so that they can mutually support each other.

The first major target of coalition building within the University was the Faculty Senate. Since the Faculty Senate had constitutional authority over the Colleges under the Prospectus, it seemed very important for the Colleges, individually and colletively, to develop close relationships with the constituent parts of the Faculty Senate system. As Dean during the first two years, I reported publicly each term to the Faculty Senate. Also I maintained close contact with the Chair of the Senate and the Chair of the Colleges Committee. I regularly attended Faculty Senate meetings. This particular exercise of coalition building was threatened by the elction in 1976 of a Chair of the Faculty Senate who was personally opposed to the Colleges and who devoted much of his time during his two-year term as Chair to attacking the Colleges. However, the ideological conservatism of this Chairperson led to his alienating a cross section of persons in the Faculty Senate so that his intemperate attacks on the Colleges were never taken seriously. The fact that the Colleges had developed strong relationships with a number of Faculty Senators made it possible for the Colleges to quarantine antagonism of the Chair quite effectively. This negative Chairperson was followed by Professor Jonathan Reichert, one of the authors of the Prospectus, as Chair of the Faculty Senate. During Professor Reichert's term, the coalition between the Colleges and important members of the Faculty Senate grew ever closer and became one of the effective political mainstays of the Colleges in the larger University.

Another major aspect of coalition building was between the

Colleges and the Academic Vice President. The Colleges reported to the Academic Vice President in a line relationship. During my term as Dean, there were four Academic Vice Presidents. This uncertainty in the Office created a grave weakness there, and the President and the Executive Vice President used that weakness to create a scapegoat in the Academic Deans meeting for any imperfections in their policies. The academic problems of the University were always blamed on the problems of the Academic Vice Presidency. Even developing a relationship with the Academic Vice President became difficult both because of the dependency of persons in that office on the President and because of the turnover. However, in 1976-77, there was an Acting Academic Vice President, Professor Robert Fisk, who had a strong political base of his own in the University and who was personally an independent individual. He decided to support the Colleges in a period of retrenchment and personally vetoed an attempt by some Deans to cut the Colleges in half in order to meet a financial cut imposed on the University. Fisk also completely changed the Academic Vice President's Office and brought in as an Associate Vice President, Professor Claude Welch, the Master of Rachel Carson College, and others who were supportive of the Collegiate System. So, institutionally, the Office of the Academic Vice President became a point not only to which the Colleges reported but also a point of cooperative relationships in the larger University.

The permanent Academic Vice President appointed after Professor Fisk was Dr. Ronald Bunn, a former Dean of Graduate Studies at the University of Houston. Dr. Bunn, a political

scientist, brought a very sophisticated view of university politics to his tasks and quickly came to understand the importance of developing strong relationships himself throughout the University. Although Dr. Bunn made some personnel changes in the Office of Academic Vice President which did not necessarily assist in cooperative relationships between the Colleges and his office, the Academic Vice President could usually be counted upon--because of his openness and commitment to consultation--by the Colleges as a senior partner both in arranging support and dealing with other issues across the University.

In addition to these University-wide points of consultative cooperation, the Colleges systematically developed individual relationships with particular departments and senior faculty across the University. At any moment in time, this network of regular university faculty with some affiliation within an individual College, and therefore an interest in the system, numbered around 200 out of a total of 1100 or 1200 faculty members. Though the number was small in percentage terms, the points of contact across the Univesity of the 200 were very broad. A number of very senior faculty members were included so that when issues involving the Colleges arose on a University-wide basis, there was always a sympathetic faculty person who could articulate the Colleges' position and develop ad hoc coalitions within a Faculty to assist in advancing the interests of the Colleges.

Perhaps the weakest point of contact between the Colleges and the rest of the University was in the Faculty of Health Sciences.

This weakness resulted from a failure of the strategy of coalition building. The Master of College H was drawn from the Office of the Vice President of Health Sciences in the thought that formal cooperation between the College with an interest in health services and the general Faculty of Health Sciences would enhance the effectiveness and political power of the College. The problem arose because of personality conflict and misunderstanding between the Master of the College and the Vice President. The Master came from an administrative background but was on a faculty appointment, and he did not accept the University ethos of publishing in order not to perish. This disappointed the Vice President for Health Sciences, who withdrew his support of the Master and, in fact, became quite negative toward College H and the Colleges. His negativism was a generalization of his negative assessment of the Master--a not unusual occurrence in any organization--but his commitment to his negative view became, over time quite unreasoning in that he was not amenable to discussing alternatives. Indeed he withdrew from any contact with the College and urged persons throughout the faculty to minimize their contacts with the College. Luckily, a few very strong Health Sciences faculty members maintained their affiliation with College H and therefore their commitment to the enchancement of the Collegiate System. Indeed, Profesor Barbara Howell of Physiology was one of the staunchest supporters in the Faculty Senate in her role as Secretary, and she later was to become Chair of the Search Committee seeking a replacement for me. But it is quite clear that in relation to the College of Health Sciences, the problem of the relationship between the

Master of that College and the Vice President for Health Sciences created an overwhelming impediment to coalition building between the Colleges and the Faculty even after that major conflict.

The focus of coalition building between the Colleges and the larger community was at the individual college level for most of the five years. One of the great strengths of the Colleges was their ability to draw on a large number of community persons to teach in their academic programs. And these community teachers themselves constituted a very important coalition with groups in the larger community. In a College such as the College of Urban Studies, judges and members of the police force taught in a criminal justice program and planners from City Hall and County government participated in the planning curriculum. College H drew overwhelmingly on health professionals in the community.

Some Colleges developed other forms of bridge building between themselves and community constituencies. For example, Rachel Carson College had a board which was essentially the point of contact among all of the environmental activits of Western New York. The College of Urban Studies had a community policy board including representatives of local banks and planning agencies as well as other community professionals. Cora P. Maloney College drew from representatives in the black community on a community policy board which had great constitutional power. Other Colleges used less formal but no less effective means to maintain coalitions. Women's Studies College always involved community persons in teaching courses and invited a number of community people to sit in on their collective governance. Tolstoy College

made important points of contact with the working class Polish community. So at any moment among all of the Colleges there was an intimate network of connections which created useful coalitions both for curriculum purposes and also for defensive political action.

The importance of these individual college-based coalition relationships was such that they provided a safety net vis-a-vis the larger University. Indeed in 1976 when there was talk of cutting the Colleges in half, it was possible, because of the contacts between particular collegs and persons in the community, to develop a contingency plan which involved going to the legislature to challenge any attempt at cutting the Colleges. This particular plan was neer put into effect but a few important politicians in Western New York and in Albany were contacted and made aware of the problem in case their intervention was necessary. This approach had dangers for the University as a whole but the fact that the Colleges could not trust the University President meant that prudence dictated a strategy which went above the President to the political community when necessary.

In 1977-78, I attempted to formalize the coalition relationship between the Colleges and the larger community by creating a Dean's Advisory Committee of important community leaders who would become involved with the general policy issues facing the Colleges. This particular exercise was only begun and not completed before my final year as Dean ended. I waited until late in my tenure as Dean for two reasons: first I wanted to be confident of program quality before bringing the community

leaders into the system; and, second, I did not wish to compete with the individual Colleges for public citizens while those Colleges were still establishing their own community boards. But the thought of draving on additional community leaders and enhancing the prestige of affiliation of those persons who were already teaching in some of the Colleges through membership on a Dean's Advisory Committee was an important further step in the maintenance of a coalition relationship between the Colleges and the larger community.

The strengthening of these external relationships was central to the evolution of power distribution within the University. These external coalitions further enchanced the contribution which the Colleges made to the community at large by providing an opportunity for community professionals to teach undergraduates and thereby, themselves, think critically and reflectively about the issues they must confront in their everyday professional tasks. The strengthening of this coalition will help those who wish to change other social institutions in Western New York by giving them a sounding board as well as a pulput in the University.

G. The Faculty Senate Prospectus--1974 and 1978

The devlopment and adoption of the Pospectus in 1974 was the necessary condition for the continued existence of the Colleges. It provided a basic written document which included criteria for evaluating the Colleges and a mechanism for carrying out that evaluation at both the individual unit and systems level. In

1974, the battle was hard fought over the language of the Prospectus. The Colleges, themselves, through their Collegiate Assembly, adamantly opposed the adoption of the Prospectus and then fought many of the provisions on a clause-by-clause basis. The resulting compromise between those who had drafted the original version and the Colleges included a number of elements which in fact made it a stronger document, although still controversial. A central dispute was over the selection of the Committee which was to evaluate individualColleges--the Chartering Committee. A compromise was worked out between those who wanted to have a completely independent committee evaluate the Colleges and those who wished that it would be dominated by the Colleges. The Colleges were allowed in the compromise to appoint some members and then to veto any members of the Committee nominated by the Faculty Senate who seemed to be philosophically opposed to the system, although the exact mechanism of veto in decision making did not demand any reasons to be given. Throughout the life of the Prospectus, this particular provision was quite controversial.

Another element of the original Prospectus which was in dispute but which turned out to be a most important component of the decision-making process was the appointment of administrative representatives to the Chartering Committee as nonvoting members. This nonvoting character was opposed by the Vice President for Health Sciences who boycotted the process after the first year. But, on balance, the participation of senior administrators or their representatives in the hearings and decision-making allowed the flow of information to administrators in senior positions to

come from persons whom they themselves had appointed. The inclusion of the nonvoting administrative representatives on the Chartering Committee was an important component of the success of the Prospectus.

In administrative terms, the most important contribution which the Prospectus made was to outline in detail the powers and the responsibilities of the Dean. Since the Colleges had never had a dean before, this description of the office in terms of powers and responsibilities created responsibilities for both the Dean and those with whom he had to deal to respect the authority when it was exercised because the responsibilities and powers had been given the assent of the Faculty Senate as well as the President. The existence of this constitutional document gave the Dean great power. A controversial provision of the Prospectus in regard to the Dean was a provision that would allow the Colleges through the Colleges Council to appeal decisions of the Dean to the Faculty Senate if two-thirds of the membership of the Colleges Council voted such an appeal. Because of the maturing of the political system this provision was never invoked. The existence of this provision created procedural justice not only in fact but also in appearance so that any arbitrary actions of the Dean could be challenged.

The central tenet of the Prospectus of 1974 was the importance of involving regular University faculty members in all levels of the Colleges' operation. Masters were to be regular University faculty members; the Dean was to be a tenured regular University faculty member; the Chartering Committee had a

majority of representatives appointed by the Faculty Senate. this attempt to involve constitutionally regular University faculty members in the life of the Colleges was in part a reaction against the domination of the Colleges by a small handful of graduate students in the early Seventies and also the result of recommendations which I and others made during the recruitment process for a Dean of the Colleges. I had indicated that the most important point of constitutional revision would be to require in the basic document that faculty participate in every level of decision making. This was not to suggest that faculty should have unilateral control over all decisions but only that the bargaining that goes into any decision should reflect the interest of the faculty and that this should be constitutionally required. This element of the Prospectus was a key to its success.

The best measure of the success of the Prospectus of 1974 is seen in the Prospectus of 1978, which was approved in the spring of 1978. This revised Prospectus contained only moderate revisions in the details of the original Prospectus. The chartering process and the requirement that the regular faculty participate at the various levels of decision making were maintained as written. The only significant change was a revision of the right of the Colleges to veto regular faculty membership in the Chartering Committee and the development of a more specific mode of vetoing which demanded justification from the Colleges. There were other minor changes and some clarification of language. But the important point is that there was no significant transformation in the overall structure. Nor

was there even a major modification of detail of the Prospectus of 1974. And the dramatic change in the relationship between the Colleges and elements of the larger University was indicated in the fact that the drafting of the newly revised Prospectus was part of a cooperative effort between the Colleges and the Faculty Senate Committee on the Colleges, which included Collegiate representation. The final document was passed by the Faculty Senate with only one abstention. The overwhelming approval of the document and the smooth process from which it emerged was in dramatic contrast to the process and conclusion of the debate over the Prospectus of 1974. The evaluation of the Colleges through the chartering process and of the system through a process which I will outline in a moment were both required by the Prospectus of 1974. This constitutional basis for evaluation with criteria and procedure was central to the construction of a mature political system and the maintenance of a creative relationship between the Colleges and the important constituencies of the larger University. It was the proximate cause of the emerging legitimacy of the Colleges.

H. The Chartering Process

The chartering process as outlined in the Prospectus is probably unique in American institutions of higher education. A number of universities have committees on program evaluation but no other operates with the strong chartering power established by the Colleges Prospectus. In the earlier section I outlined the way in which membes of the Chartering Committee were appointed

according to the Prospectus. Here I should indicate the procedures used in the chartering process and briefly report the results of chartering over the five-year period.

The process of evaluation itself was an interesting learning exercise for all of those who participated in it. And over the five years the procedures were refined to such a degree that the amount of information generated and the depth of judgments made became relatively sophisticated. The process began under the worst possible conditions. During the first year of chartering, 1974-75, the Chartering Committee had to review the records of 12 colleges. This large number almost broke the system although the enterprise itself developed its structure at this time and established the basis for further more refined reviews in the coming years. The procedure used during the first year was to divide the Committee into subcommittees to prepare the initial assessment of each individual College and then to hold a bpulic hearing for each Collegefor the whole Committee to collect additional information and testimony. The public hearing process turned into a circus. The spectacle of the public hearings almost destroyed the credibility of the whole chartering process. But, by the end of the first year, the chartering process had at least survived and the first lessons were leaned about how to begin to make assessments of Colleges according to the criteria of the Prospectus and then to write reports which set certain conditions for improvement over a specific period of time. Most of the Colleges during the first round received only tentative approval of charters for one or two years.

As the chartering process evolved, the role of subcommittees

became ever more important and the development of more detailed files of analysis of individual Colleges prior to the discussion of the whole Committee became the rule not the exception. Public hearings were jettisoned in favor of a meeting of representatives of the Colleges and the whole Committee at which time a draft report of the subcommittee was considered. A formal procedure of interaction between the subcommittee and the individual College under consideration, as well as the review of all written documents in draft from by the College prior to discussion by the larger Committee, provided all of the procedural safeguards necessay without the circus atmosphere of public hearings. No College complained of unfairness during the course of the chartering process.

Once the Chartering Committee prepared its recommendations, they were forwarded to the President, who collected comments from the Vice Presidents and Deans. Later in the evaluation of the system, the Chartering Committee reported first to the Vice President for Academic Affairs who collected additional comments before forwarding his recommendations to the President. The President never disagreed with a Chartering Committee recommendation, which was also supported by me on the merits of chartering, but the President did on occasion disagree in regard to the specific duration of the charter.

Over five years, the chartering process provided limited duration charters of from one to three years for a dozen Colleges. It approved the creation of a new College, which emerged under the workshop process envisaged by the Prospectus,

whereby a new College would exist in workshop form for at least two semesters prior to review by the chartering process. An International College was created in this manner. Two Colleges were actually terminated by the chartering process--the Social Sciences College and the New College of Modern Education. Two Colleges were transformed by the process--The College of Urban Studies was created out of the old College Z and C. P. Snow College; and Cora P. Maloney College evolved out of the old College E. These transformations occurred because of the interest of a few members of a specific College in maintining a unit, although most of the members of the College were opposed.

The chartering process provided a creative moment of review both internally and externally which allowed all the Colleges to think critically about their individual programs. The process itself deserves much closer review, evaluation, and analysis, because it seems to be one of the longest standing sunset laws and evaluation procedures existing in American higher education. Because of the time-limited charters given individual colleges under the chartering process, the expectation of review and evaluation is built into the process. So formative review is more likely to go on a year-to-year basis in anticipation of a summative evaluation.

The focus of the chartering process was on the individual unit and an evaluation of it. In the next few years, however, because of the continuing decline in the resources available to the larger University, this process will have to become much more comparative between individual Colleges and all other Colleges because of the resource implications of a decision to continue a

College. At the very least, the creation of a new college will demand the elimination of an old one. This resource-relevant judgment--though not resource judgment in itself--should improve the quality and standards applied in the chartering process and therefore entail some improvement in the overall quality of the collegiate program. However, it will be accompanied by great pain.

I. A Tentative Judgment of Success--The Review of the Colleges

The Prospectus of 1974 required that the Colleges be evaluated after four years. The whole system would be reviewed in anticipation of the revision of the Prospectus and the adoption of a new Prospectus. The character of this review grew out of the Prospectus itself, although the occasion for it was not only the review of the Prospectus but a demand of the President that there be an evaluation of the system. The President remained skeptical.

In consultation with the Academic Vice President, the Colleges agreed to an evaluation by persons outside of the system and the University in collaboration with the Colleges Committee of the Faculty Senate. Three external evaluators were invited to spend two days on campus looking at the system and talking to those participating in it and those who dealt with it from the larger University. The Chair of the 1978 evaluation committe was a person who had been part of a committee brought in in 1973 to suggest changes in the old collegiate system. Professor B. K. Chandrashaker, distinguished physicist from Case Western Reserve

University, chaired the 1978 committee which, in addition, included, Dr. Alberta Arthurs, President of Chatham College of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Dr. Daniel Arnaud, Vice President of the Salzburg Seminars in American Studies and a former Executive Director of the Thomas Watson Foundation (which provides scholarships and fellowships to distinguished graduates of small liberal arts colleges). This 1978 committee had Professor Chandrashaker's touchstone of the past from which to look at the present, and all of the Committee members' extensive contacts throughout American higher education to provide context.

The general judgment of this evaluation committee was that the Colleges had made great strides in the past four years and that they had achieved a sophisticated system unique in American higher education. Of course all was not well in that there needed to be greater support from the larger University and perhaps further attention by the Colleges themselves to some of their internal procedures. But the overall judgment was clearly positive and played a part in the adoption of the new Prospectus by the Faculty Senate.[8]

The existence of this evaluation process built into the Prospectus and implemented by the distinguished group of outsiders played an important role in the maintenance of the collegiate system. The evaluation in 1973 prior to the first Prospectus generated a report which was crucial in persuading me to come to the Colleges in the first place. The second evaluation provided a documentary statement which justified the continuation of the Colleges and in some ways confirmed the

enthusiasm for the Colleges, which the Colleges themselves held and which was supported by a number of people who were not always in the majority in the rest of the University. The actual political impact of this report was not great but undoubtedly was useful to the new Dean of the Colleges. This summative evaluation of the system as a whole was the concluding tactic of the overall strategy of an institutional evaluation system through the Prospectus.

J. Planning and Innovation

Perhaps the major area of presidential involvement in the life of the Univesity during the five years from 1974-79 was in the area of attempting to create an academic plan. The President, an engineer, viewed the process of creating a plan as a relatively technocratic undertaking of finding a right answer for the future of the University, legislating it, and expecting the University then to follow it.

The first major exercise of planning by the President during my tenure as Dean was an undertaking in 1975-76 during which he appointed a committee of faculty members drawn from different parts of the University with one graduate student and undergraduate member to draft an Academic Plan. This committee was chaired by the then Dean of Graduate Faculties, Professor Mac Hull and the Chair of the History Department, Professor Clifton Yearley. This Hull-Yearley Committee met for a year in closed-door sessions and then rendered a document which in essence evaluated every single unit on campus and suggested certain priorities.[9] When this document was published with its

evaluative comments based upon closed-door decision making, there was a general uproar. The arbitrariness of some of the judgments and the softness of the data used as well as the lack of agreement about priorities within the Committee and between it and the President, all combined to create a political disaster. The Hull-Yearley Committee Report was generally negative toward the Colleges in its recommended reduction of particular units and challenge to the offering of courses for credit. The Collegiate System was among those revolting against the judgments, but the opposition cut across all divisions and was quite general. This particular exercise in the installation of Philosophers-King to engineer a plan for the future of the University died a rather fast death. The President had no Allisonian insight into the planning process and viewed strategy in rational action rather than political and bureaucratic terms.

When the new Academic Vice President was appointed in 1976, he saw the folly of viewing planning as a technocratic instead of a political process and developed his own system based upon the development of mission statements by individual Faculties and the Colleges followed by a process of consultation in the development of the plan.

The Vice President's planning process was not in place. The process of consultation was more individual than collective and relatively hierarchial. The results were very traditional and not necessarily recognize the subtleties of sophisticated planning. However, the Vice President's report was tentative and time-limited and clearly recognizes the fact that one does not

write "a plan" for a university as complex as this one. Planning was viewed as an interactive process that is political in nature, that requires certain sorts of guidelines to influence everyday decision making, and that is basically a guide to resource allocation. What is missing in even the Vice President's plan is a useful procedure for on-going decision making that generates information and provides occasions for the development of coalitions across the University to take decisions in a way which assesses the relevant future implications of them. Instead, it seems to be a set of guidelines which are being used for resource allocations by the Vice President's Office.

The value of the present process is that it is based upon extensive consultation including discussions with the Colleges, which means that there should be a political base for the plan that is totally apart from the President and therefore will set certain constraints upon political action by the President. Although the Colleges may not be treated as positively as they would like in the plan, present indications are that in the context of the total document the acceptance by the President of this political tract will indeed assist the Colleges in continuing to develop as they think they ought.

The Colleges' participation in the planning process was rather different from that of some units in that their mission statement focused upon the development of internal procedures in the Colleges for setting priorities and generating relevant information for making judgments to assess their future implications. There was no attempt to lay out a plan in terms of detailed statements of what would happen by a certain date.

However, it should be pointed out that a number of commitments were made with dates certain and that most of those commitments were met within the time scale articulated have already been met. The focus of the Colleges in that planning process was on the procedures for everyday decision making and not upon the statement of exceedingly abstract goals, although the procedures themselves were justified in value terms.

In the context of the larger University only the Colleges established a mechanism for long-range planning that was specifically designed to take a longer view of issues. The Long-Range Planning Committee was concerned with issues that would affect the overall operation not only of the Colleges but also of the larger University. It was charged to establish policy positions for the Colleges Council which would attempt to relate these major trends and forces to the more immediate questions which the Colleges are always addressing. The Long-Range Planning Committee prepared the Colleges' Mission Statement and in subsequent years addressed the evolution of the Prospectus and the Colleges possible contribution to general education programs, both of which were central issues for the long-term future of the Colleges. This institutional innovation of establishing a political forum for talking about longer range issues systematically seems to me to be a contribution which the Colleges have made by example to the planning process, and thereby to have suggested to the larger University a way of dealing with the limitations of the central leadership in the University.

If the Colleges were successful, and other units on campus developed similar institutional mechanisms for longer range decision making, then this tactical step would have strategic implications that would best allow the Colleges to confront the leadership antagonism. But even this tactic was viewed as opposition to the President, so the antagonism will only change when there is significant change in leadership. However, in viewing the Colleges/President relationship, it is useful to understand the asymmetry of importance to the two sides: the Colleges were inconvenient and frustrating to the President but not high on his agenda of important problems, whereas for the Colleges the antagonism was a matter of daily and critical importance.

V. THE LESSONS

In the previous sections I reported strategies and tactics which seemed to guide changes in the Colleges system from the period 1974 to 1979. It will now be useful to draw some general lessons from these attempts at implementing the strategies through the variety of tactics which I outlined. These lessons are those which I have personally taken from the experience which I believe to be policy relevant for all of those who wish to understand the process of change in universities. These lessons are informed by sensitivity to my theoretical framework with its emphasis on alternative institutions as focuses for change in contemporary society, although the experiences themselves suggest revisions which I will comment upon in the next section.

A. Constitutionalism

Perhaps one of the most important contributions which the United States has made to the process of governance is the way in which it has illustrated the value of constitutions in the political process. The American Constitution was not the first nor the last constitution to be written. But its value is that it represents the result of a political process in which important value disagreements occured but where certain accommodations were reached and encapsulated in a fundamental document to which the political process has been held accountable. The constitution as written did not represent an agreement about specific values held by everyone who signed it and by every state approving it. But it did represent an accommodation among conflicting values which was viewed as minimally acceptable. Without claiming too much by analogy for the Prospectus as it related to the development of the Colleges from 1974 through 1979, I would have to argue that it served the same constitutional function and confirmed the importance of having a codified set of value judgments which set certain sorts of substantive limits on the political process and outlined the overall procedural and institutional framework for the system.

The way in which constitutionalism often manifests itself in contemporary institutions in general and universities in particular is through a process of by-laws development which represents relatively dreary discussions ending in not very important agreements. The political process leading up to the Prospectus was quite different. It involved a vigorous

substantive debate and great disagreement, and many compromises over the Chartering Committee composition and charge, the power of the Dean, and the requirement of faculty membership for Masters' appointments. But in the end, there was a broad middle group strongly supporting the Prospectus throughout the University. This agreement by the larger political system set limits upon the way in which disagreement within the Colleges or by the President could be expressed.

The very existence of the Prospectus transformed the framework within which the political system would evolve. The role of regular University faculty was required. A strong leader in the Colleges was mandated. Regular evaluation based on a set of substantive criteria was central to the operation of the constitution. All of these judgments were codified and, therefore, a matter of public knowledge based upon political agreement. Thus, once the document was approved, there was little ground for fundamental attack on the overall institutional structure.

The existence of the Prospectus was critical to me in my role as Dean. In addition to outlining a strong istitutional place for the Dean of the Colleges, it provided a point of reference for justifying decisions not only by myself but by all of those in the system and in the University. It also created a timetable and particular occasions for evaluative judgments which, in its absence, even the most rigorous and demanding person might put off given the lethargy of human nature.

All social institutions develop their own standard operating

procedures which influence a range of activities. People within bureaucratic organizations operating by standard operating procedures do not search for optimality but instead "satisfice" within the limits which those standard operating rules and procedures suggest. The important transformational role of the Prospectus was that it changed some of the basic standard operating procedures of the Colleges and forced a rethinking of many others which were not necessarily mentioned in the Prospectus but which were affected by the limits placed by the Prospectus on the life of the Colleges. The appointment of Masters, decisions about courses, the dynamics of the chartering process, and the institution of a strong Dean significantly changed the rules of the game and therefore the standard operating procedures which meant that when judgment were made, a new set of decision rules would be invoked.

As the Federalist Papers so clearly recognized, the development of a written constitution lays the groundwork for relatively reasonable decision-making processes. The substance of the constitution is important but still second to the existence of the constitution which is viewed as authoritative because of the decision-making processes upon which it was based. The relatively minor changes in the Prospectus at the end of four years stand as a testament not only to the quality of the substantive judgments encapusulated in the Prospectus but to the political process that rendered the fundamental document and guaranteed its integrity through interpretation during the next four years. The Prospectus clearly limited both the Colleges and the University in that it provided an evaluation procedure and

standards to be imposed in evaluation. Anyone who wished to take an action within or without the Colleges concerning the Colleges had to justify that action by reference to the Prospectus.

B. Consultation and Participation

One of the major problems facing comtemporary institutions is devising ways of encouraging decision making which allow all of those with an interest at stake to participate in the process of making judgments. The difficulty is in establishing procedures whereby those with interests at stake can participate in decision making and at the same time maintain some level of substantive wisdom in the process of judgment. This requires developing various levels of decision making and clear lines of accountability to all those affected by a set of decisions.

In theory, in 1974 the Colleges had a participatory decision-making process whereby every person in the Colleges had an equal voice in decisions for the system. The reality, however, suggested three problems with this supposed simple participatory process: first, only the interest of the leadership of individual units actually was represented in the collective decision-making system; second, the supposedly participatory system was in fact overwhelmingly dominated by a handful of very strong personalities who were not accountable to anyone other than the supposed collective decision-making system; third, decisions were being made on almost no information so that if one were to take any reasonable standards to evaluate the

quality of the decisions, for the most part the decisions were very poor indeed.

In the Spring of 1974, the decisions about the budget clearly illustrate all three points. Each College brought in its budget requests which represented a total of over five times the amount of money available. There was then an attempt to justify each and every line item of each and every budget. In fact the actual "hearings" ended upon allowing reports of no more than half the Colleges in any detail. Then four people adjourned to a second meeting to draft a budget. This budget was then passed by a majority vote of one. There was no attemmpt to compare the performance of units in relation ot the resources available. There was no attempt to assess the impact of any individual unit on the general student constituency or for that matter in the context of priorities of the University and the surrounding community. The Assembly as a whole was in no way accountable to anyone in the University except for the han lful of graduate students who had seleted the Assembly representatives. And finally, there was not information, only ideological posturing and unjustified value judgments.

The Prospectus addressed these problems by clearly identifying a point of decision making accountable to the larger University in the person of the Dean. It transformed the rhetoric of the system from participatory to consultative. I shall argue in a moment that in fact decision making was much more participatory in the consultative system than the supposedly participatory decision-making arrangements. All of those representing individual units in the consultative process had to

be selected according to procedures evaluated through the Chartering process. A set of goals was envisaged in the Prospectus and articulated through the Dean's Office and a number of representatives in the Colleges, which began to focus upon clear service to students. Then a process of assessing the performance of Colleges relative to each other in terms of services to students emerged in order to provide some hard information upon which to base comparative judgments which are entailed by any budgetary process. In Allisonian language, the process acknowledged the reality of bureaucratic procedures and politics.

In the curriculum area, the decision making was arranged as a two-level process in that a Curriculum Committee including representatives from all of the Colleges participated in evaluating courses submitted by each College, and then recommendations were forwarded to the Dean, who made a further independent judgment. However, as Dean, I or a member of my staff participated actively in the deliberations of the Curriculum Committee every bit as much as in those of the Budget Committee.

It was this active participation by the Dean's Office in the deliberations of the Colleges Council and its committees which provided the necessary connection between consultation and participation. Many consultative processes are viewed as exercises in listening to what other people say. This approach to consultative decision making seems to me to miss the important claims which participatory systems make. Not only must the

decision maker listen in a consultative process but he/she must also vigorously state his or her views so they may be challenged in the process of argument in the participatory decision-making process. In order that there may be accountability, there should be a point of decision not only by a legislative body but by the person or persons who must carry out policies. And, in universities, this become especially important, because although it is critical that every interest be understood and treated equally, it is also aboslutely necessary that decisions be made not just upon a majority decision-making rule but upon substantive and justifiable judgments about the "ought" given the needs of the situation. However, in order to justify this form of accountability in a democratic society, it seems to be a moral obligation on the part of the decision-maker to test his or her tentative judgments before making a final decision through a participatory analysis offered by all of those with an interest at stake in the decision. So that transformation from a so-called participatory decision-making process to a consultative process was in fact only one of identifying a point of responsibility which then could be placed into the overall context of the larger University and social system.

Early on in my Deanship I was challenged by the leader of the former Assembly to state whether or not I would abide by the decision of the Assembly. My response was that I had a responsibility not only to those represented in the old Assembly but also to the larger University and indeed the public citizens of the State of New York, and in meeting these obligations I would have to consider more than a sum of the interests involved

in the Collegiate Assembly. However, once the Assembly was transformed into the Council and the political evolution outlined earlier occurred, I was in fact always able to persuade those participating in the Council deliberations to understand the elements that went into the position I was articulating and there was never a fundamental disagreement of principle between me and the Council. But the possiblity that the Dean of the Colleges would make a decision that was different from that of the Council seems to me to be inherent in a consultative process which identifies an executive point of decision making but demands that the executive test his or her ideas in a legislative setting before making a decision. The possibility that the Dean might make another decision seems to me to be every bit as important as the fact that I never did.

A final important element in the transformation from a so-called participatory process to the consultative process was developing an institutional device for providing adequate information to the consultative decision-making process. The appointment of an institutional researcher serving not only the Dean but the deliberative process as well was a critical factor in the substantive wisdom of many of the consultative decisions made. The fact that there was a person who could be asked to generate information, which then could be challenged in a public forum, was central to the ability of the deliberative process to generate new ideas. The relatively modest investment in a grduate student with the combination of political and technical skills necessary to collect information and then communicate it

in a creative and policy-relevant manner was one of the better investments made of the limited resources available to the Colleges.

C. The Impact of University Context

A major lesson that the University reformer can learn from an examination of the Collegiate experience at the State University of New York at Buffalo is the resilience of the overall structure and value commitments of the larger University. Although Martin Meyerson and his staff firmly believed in the need to develop neighborhoods cutting across disciplines and constituencies and developed a plan for so doing, they were unable to make significant changes in the overall University context. This lack of significant change at the systems level made the possible impact of the existence of the Colleges as an alternative institution much less in scale and in scope.

Two extenuating factors though are relevant in assessing the resilience of the existing institutional setting and its imperviousness to change. First, the period of time during which the University had leadership sympathetic to the changes represented by the Colleges was relatively brief. Meyerson arrived in 1966 and was gone by 1969-70. No more than three full years were spent by Meyerson in the University. A second special factor about this University context is the fact that the University was at a point of dramatic change from being a modest private university to a large university center intent upon emerging as the Berkeley of the East. This commitment to become a first-rank research University established the ethos of the

Buffalo Center and also helped create a sense of inferiority among those who were actually part of the enterprise. They were always judging themselves by a model of Berkeley or Michigan. Of course there is nothing wrong with these as models of major research universities. The problem has been that the resources have never been committed to the State University of New York at Buffalo that would allow it to match these research giants. My aphorism for the mistake of pursuing this particular mirage in the context of our University Center has been that this University has spent its life trying to be the best University the 1950s ever saw instead of developing its own unique sense of mission.

But the context is very important and this commitment to the goal of becoming a major research center has established priorities which do not necessarily provide first-rate undergraduate education, nor encourage experimentation with alternative forms of learning and teaching, nor, for that matter, first-rate research. Therefore, the values encapsulated in the Colleges and their vision have not been supportive of the values of the larger University. And the political strength of the Colleges has never been such that it has been able to develop the coalitions necessary to recreate a sense of the future of the University which would not be necessarily inconsistent with the commitment to research and the advancement of knowldge but which would place it in a new perspective based upon the realities of the Seventies and the Eighties. Therefore, the particular institutional enviroment is absolutely central to an

understanding of the possibilities for change. No simple diagnosis of change will be useful without a careful understanding of the unique characteristics of particular organizational setting and institutional framework. Change at the State University of New York at Buffalo may require significantly different strategies from those in a university such as Harvard, a college such as Amherst or another multiversity such as the University of California at Los Angeles. Sensitivity to the impact of a particular university setting is an important lesson which the Collegiate System has to teach more from its failures than from its accomplishments.

D. The Limits of Planning and Economic Rationality in the University

One of the dangers of modern university life is the belief that most if not all of the problems of the university can be solved in the interest of all of those in the university and outside. The State University of New York at Buffalo has been especially susceptible to following this particularly beguiling phantom and has devoted a great deal of energy to planning reports, master planning, and mission statements. And the so-called bottom line of all of these planning endeavors has been to develop one or two decision-making rules that will then guide an economic analysis of the enterprise and then render an appropriate resource allocation scheme by which all of the participants will abide in the future.

In the work of Graham Allison one sees the limitations of a rational actor model based upon economic rationality in

explaining any interesting set of events--particularly those which Allison himself analyzes in the Cuban Missile Crisis. But the importance of a rational actor model correctly stated and analyzed is that it represents the umbrella under which all other decisions must be taken. If that umbrella is to be designed to be consistent only with economic rationality, then it assumes a market environment where there is complete knowledge and decisions are made strictly in the form of self-interest according to a utilitarian calculus. We have approximately 300 years of ethical theory which suggests the limitations of utilitarian modes of analysis as a complete set of normative guidelines for decision making in a system of moral individuals and institutions. The critical point is to understand that the decision-making framework for evaluating alternatives is one which involves the interest of individuals in a collective system. This means that decisions should follow from a procedure which allows those whose future will be at stake to participate in the decision making.

But beyond the procedural issues there is also the question of the substantive criteria for evaluating the actual decisions and thereby justifying them. It is in this context that the experience of the Colleges is relevant. There was a committee for budget; another for curriculum. There was yet another for addressing long-range issues. But all were integrated into a deliberative process that guaranteed consultation as well as a point of final responsibility for making judgments. The system itself did not work perfectly and will not work perfectly. The sophistication of the information provided and of the judgments

made was really not great. But the framework itself does suggest that if one wishes to develop planning systems one must structure an overall decision-making process where written plans and limited decision-making rules are secondary to some fundamental changes in a system which guarantees consultation, not dictation.

Planning in the Colleges was always that of debating the general principles, developing secondary measures which may begin to assess the unit-cost relationships within the system, and then providing a structured argumentative process for finally reaching a decision. The structure of the argument differed; the particular committee environment changed; but in the end, the process was one of formal justification leading to a decision which itself had to be justified within an agreed-to framework. The more future oriented this process can become, the more likely it would be to offer a model for continuing planning and policy development. There is always the risk of special-interest pleading, but when this political risk is acknowledgeed through a public process, the benefit of active participation far outweighs the harm which "faction" success might create. And the likelihood of special pleading is far greater in a hierarchical system behind closed doors than in an open system which clearly demands that the future implications of present decisions be justified within a formal value context. If the Colleges as a system can offer this lesson, then their value would justify any other cost which the system itself creates.

VI. A REVISION OF THEORY AND STRATEGY

In the previous section, I have outlined some of the intermediate lessons which one can draw from the experience of the Collges. But since my whole approach to the Colleges was colored by a theory of change, I think it would be useful to draw on the Colleges experience and the lessons which I have outlined to reassess the overall theory of change which I presented at the beginning. The alternative institutions approach itself requires some revision if we are to take the lessons learned from the Collegiate experience seriously. My experience with the Colleges suggests the need to revise a theoretical view of how alternative institutions fit into a general scheme of institutional change on two points: first, in regard to the relationship with the leadership of the larger system; and second, on the impact of an environment of economic decline on the process of change.

In my earlier referral to the development of open classroom and legal services, I was not sensitive enough to the role of sympathetic leadership in the larger system. Always where one finds successful replication of innovation in the British educational system one sees a leader, or collection of leaders, in the next larger system with an interest in testing new ideas. There is not necessarily a commitment to the particular idea under investigation but a propensity to look for interesting new approaches to problems. This receptiveness of the leadership of the host system is a point that is critical to the possible success of an alternative institution. An alternative institution, indeed coalitions of alternative institutions, might

have some impact on the development of policy in an unreceptive bureaucratic environment; but significant transformation of that environment demands leadership of the host unit that is willing to devote its energy and fiscal and psychological support to those who are trying new ideas and that creates an environment that encourages those others in the host unit to try out approaches that have been tested in the alternative setting. The role of chief education officers in strategic local educational authorities in Great Britain was critical to the establishment of the open classroom. The role of sympathetic Attorneys General and two Presidents was central to the commitment to the development of a national system of legal services and pro bono provision of services in the private sector of legal practice.

The fact that the central administration of the University was antagonistic to the alternative institution of the Colleges and most of the innovative strategies developed in them set a severe limit on the way in which the theory of alternative institutions could provide appropriate guidance that would allow the transformation of the larger host system. And it is unlikely that the alternative institution can alter the views of antagonistic leadership; the most it can aspire to is to assist in changing the leadership and to maintain its own existence and relative freedom in an unfriendly environment.

Both the dissemination of the open classroom idea and the development of an institutional basis for public legal services occurred in settings of expanding resources in the larger social system. Neither of these innovations themselves was handsomely

supported at any level but the larger host institutional settings were in periods of increasing prosperity. The budgets of the British educational system increased dramatically after the second World War and the amount of public monies devoted to legal services and the law in general increased significantly in the 1960s and the early 1970s. Now we face a time of reduced resources available to the larger social system. This means that host bureaucratic units will be able to take seriously ideas tested in alternative settings only by substituting those ideas and new persons skilled in implementing these ideas for those presently in place in the host settings. The threat which alternative institutions immediately represent in terms of the resources they use will become a much more significant impediment to the development of alternative institutions and the likelihood that alternative institutions will be able to transform host systems.

However, the environment of economic decline does not itself entail the destruction of the usefulness of the strategy of developing alternative institutions and coalitions of such institutions in order to change host systems. It only suggests that the most important task of alternative institutions will be to be able to demonstrate that they are able to accomplish a particular goal more effectively in a cost-efficient manner. Also, though cost efficiency and cost effectiveness themselves will certainly not guarantee the acceptance of an innovation, they necessarily will be conditions for any attempt to change the character of host societies. Whatever other values will be advanced and will be seen to be advanced by the activities of

alternative institutions, none will be more important than to be able to provide whatever improved services are offered at bargain-basement prices. So the focus for a strategy for change based on the theory of alternative institutions must be on developing cost-effective and cost-efficient approaches to change.

The fact that cost-efficient and cost-effective approaches in and of themselves will not suffice is illustrated by the experience of the Colleges. There is absolutely no doubt about the cost efficiency of the Colleges, although there might be some dispute about the cost effectiveness of some of them. However, neither cost efficiency nor cost effectiveness by themselves would persuade those who disagreed with the Colleges that they should be supported or that their approaches should be adopted because of the necessary reduction in the resources available to others. The "turfism" of all social institutions is a reality with which anyone interested in change must deal; in universities the "turfism" is given a grand theoretical justification in the sociology of disciplines so that any challenge to the monopoly of particular disciplines creates a very strong counter-reaction. This means that cost efficiency and cost effectiveness arguments themselves will have to be coupled with clear demonstrations that not only can education be provided in a more effective manner in a particularly innovative program but also that the knowledge production hegemonies of disciplines will not in themselves be torn down. The multi-disciplinary character of the Colleges and some other innovative programs must be shown to meet canons

analogous to those of the disciplines, such as agreement on the strategy of investigation and validation. Only by the strength of analogy can some legitimacy be claimed and this legitimacy must be coupled with both cost efficiency and cost effectiveness.

If the integrity of the alternative institution is to be maintained, its attempts at legitimacy through analogy must not rest on the adoption of the practices of the traditional host system. Indeed in a period of declining resources, cost efficiency and cost effectiveness in relation to goals that can be viewed as shared by disciplines and universities might make it feasible to justify alternative institutions which in the past might have been viewed as illegitimate.

The alternative institutions strategy does suggest that the model used in sociological literature to analyze dissemination of innovation needs to be reconsidered. The real issue is the changing institutional context for innovation and the politics of coalitions of institutions. An institutional analysis might be more productive than the accepted paradigm of dissemination.

The revised account of alternative institutions maintains the importance of establishing institutional bases for testing new ideas in complex bureaucracies but recognizes the constraints which economic decline places upon all attempts at innovation and the critical role of the leadership of the larger host system. This revised account can provide a critical framework for assessing alternative strategies for institutional change. The experience of the Colleges as a crucible for testing this theory suggests that the dvelopment of a constitutional system with strong participation and consultation can provide a continuing

and strong operational base from which to test alternative approaches to important problems. But insofar as one wishes to challenge the larger system and transform it in a manner consistent with the values and tactices of the alternative institution, one will have to deal with the realities of economic decline by focusing on the cost effectiveness of the alternative approaches to problems and upon the political realities of the leadership of the host system. The alternative institution will self-consciously have to participate in coalition building to place in positions of leadership in the larger system persons who are willing to tolerate the testing which is endemic to the existence of alternative institutions within host bureaucracies. The need for sympathetic leadership is critical to the future transformation of any host system.

The combination of economic decline in the social setting and an antagonistic host leadership established the major constraints on the operations of the Colleges. But if the Colleges and other similarly situated alternative institutions recognize the need to be candid and/or so subtle in developing political strategies that influence the selection of host system leadership, the maintenance of the institutional base of an alternative within a host bureaucracy will become a critical strategic part of changing the system.

The stance of the alternative institution must be one of strategic planning for change. The focus must be upon publicly accountable and strongly participatory consultation in the decision making of the larger institution. The alternative

institution, by having those who think critically and analytically about alternative approaches to the whole range of institutional problems facing the host system, will be in a strong position to participate actively in the resolution of many debates which are endemic to the operation of complex bureaucracies. The more often the alternative institution is viewed as the source of useful ideas for dealing with problems facing the host system, the more likely that the alternative institution's influence in the host political system will be enhanced.

CONCLUSION

The reality of institutional change demands the existence of alternative institutions as sources of criticism within comples bureaucracies. The host system itself will never tolerate happily the existence of such institutions, but it will be viewed in the interests of a post-industrial system to have an institutional mechanism for testing new ideas. The self-interest of the host institution in surviving and perhaps even prospering will enhance its toleration of an alternative unit if that unit is viewed as actively meeting needs that are not met regularly by the host.

The Colleges have been tolerated both because of the political power which they themselves have been able to generate by their visibility and because they are seen to be meeting a diverse set of needs not being met elsewhere in the University. In a period of reduced financial resources and a reduced pool of

possible enrollees, the more the Colleges are viewed as being successful in meeting their own goals, the more likely they will be viewed as useful strategic units for helping the host university survive. The risk is that the insecurity which the question of survival raises may in a period of economic delcine create such resource scarcity that reasonableness in decision making will give way to hidden private agendas being arbitrarily pursued behind closed doors. It is for that reason that a commitment to an open political process is the necessary condition for the continuation of alternative institutions in mature societies. And it is for that reason that the public critical role of the Colleges will contribute most to their continuation.

NOTES

1. See for example, Hans N. Weiler, "Notes on the Comparative Study of Educational Innovation," unpublished paper presented at the National Workshop on the Comparative Study of Innovation in the Public Sector, International Institute for Comparative Research (WZB) West Berlin, December 14-19, 1979, and David H. Dill and Charles P. Friedman, "An Analysis Framework for Research of Innovation and Change in Higher Education." Review of Educational Research , 49, 3 (Summer 1979), pp. 411-435.

2. John Rawls. Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972.

3. Paul Diesing, Patterns of Social Discovery in the Social Sciences. Aldine, Chicago, 1971.

4. Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. Basic, NY, 1973.

5. Little Brown, Boston, 1971.

6. Cost per student credit took the total number of credit hours generated by a unit and divided that sum into the total budget of the unit.

7. Report of the external evaluators for the Colleges, June, 1978.

8. Interim Report of the Academic Planning Committee for the University, February 1977.

9. Annual Report of the Colleges, 1978.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES

1. F. D. Duryea, Perceptions of Faculty-Governing Board Relations, 1900-1969 (September 1978)

2. Arthur Levine, The Life and Death of Innovation in Higher Education (December 1978)

3. Peter P. Olevnik, A Guide to Reference Sources in Higher Education (July 1979)

4. E. D. Duryea, Prologue to the American System of Higher Education: Higher Learning in Western Culture (July 1979)

5. Philip G. Altbach, The Academic Profession: Perspectives on an International Crisis (with Bibliography) (October 1979)

6. Martin J. Finkelstein, Understanding American Academics: What Have We Learned and Where Do We Go From Here? (January 1980)

7. Robert Berdahl and Elizabeth French, Who Guards the Guardians? The Evaluation of Statewide Boards of Higher Education (August 1980)

8. Irving J. Spitzberg, Jr., Changing Universities: The Politics of Innovation in a Large Multiversity (March 1981)

These papers are available for $3 (prepaid) from the Department of Higher Education. Please make check out to "Faculty of Educational Studies."

Department of Higher Education
Faculty of Educational Studies
479 Christopher Baldy Hall
State University of New York at Buffalo
Buffalo, New York 14260